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"A good trader must be very honest in business 
because you get many friends and therefore widens 
your trading network ... Never cheat customers, 
especially the illiterate village people by adjusting the 
weighing scale to take wrong measurement and never 
take advantage of their illiteracy by paying them less 
for their produce. If you establish yourself as honest 
they tend to recommend their friends to come to this 
honest store. Be very courteous to customers, wel-
come them as they are visitors to your home and not 
to your business. Treat them as your bosses, they are 
the ones from whom you get your income" (An 
Iganga maize trader). 
The present study deals with commercialized maize in Iganga town in 
the Eastern part of Uganda with focus on a group of small-scale traders 
and their economic performance in the fractural surface between two 
transactional orders, a peasant and a market sphere of exchange. Thus, 
each of these economic spheres comprises its own morality; the peasant 
sphere is based on the axiom ofamity and the obligation to share within 
the kinship group, and the market sphere is based 011 the axiom of 
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individualism and profit maximisation. To handle this intrinsic conflict 
between individual achievement and the common interest of the kinship 
group and the local community, the traders follow advanced economic 
strategies in which they manipulate and negotiate the principles of both 
the peasant and the market spheres through the creation of trust-based 
and tested trading partnerships. Thus, due to the general lack of botli 
institutional and personal trust in the Ugandan society, the issue of 
locating reliable trading partners cannot just be taken for granted, but lias 
to be worked 011. From this derives the crucial role of trust for these 
traders and what could be called a development from the "pre-modern" 
ascribed trust to the contemporary earned trust, and from focus on 
kinship to focus 011 friendship. 
The contemporary food (or produce) trade has historically roots 
back to the Indian control of marketing and processing of produce from 
the beginning of this century and until the establishment o f the Coopera-
tive Movement, more specifically the Produce Marketing Board, in 1968. 
From this point the Indians gradually lost control of the sector until they 
in 1972 finally were expelled by the Amin regime. The local Ugandans 
who had taken over the produce sector after the Indians were not 
successful with the former export marketing, and produce marketing 
became directed towards an exclusively domestic market. However, the 
collapse of the state marketing of traditional cash crops during the 
economic crisis and the civil war in the 1970s and 1980s created a new 
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room for manoeuvre for the Ugandan food traders. New markets for 
crops such as rice, maize, beans, soyabeans, and sesame seeds developed 
within the country and/or in neighbouring countries, and the agricultural 
production became directed towards these markets. The former income-
earning strategy based on sale of cash crops such as cotton and coffee 
was replaced by an income-earning strategy based on sale of commer-
cialised food crops. Yet, for the peasant farmer the income generating 
strategy remained based 011 a combined home-consumption and a cash 
crop production although the sales crops changed from traditional cash 
crops to commercialised food crops. 
Within this new peasant- and trader created market place, maize 
was primarily marketed at a domestic market as well as smuggled to 
Kenya. However, the liberalization process embarked by the introduction 
of Structural Adjustment Programmes formalized the previous informal 
marketing of maize allowing new players to enter the market arena. From 
the beginning of (lie 1990s various relief organizations who were sending 
food aid to distressed neighbouring countries began to operate at the 
Ugandan food market. During the same period the Kenyan market was 
liberalized, and the border became officially open for import of maize 
from Uganda. At the time of the fieldwork of the present study three 
markets for maize existed, the Kenyan market, the relief market, and the 
domestic market. The relief market is dominated by the World Food 
Programme, but it also includes relief agencies such as the International 
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Committee of Red Cross, The International Federation of Red Cross, and 
lately also EU joined the market. Apart from the major players also 
smaller NGO's (for example the Lutheran World Federation) are 
purchasing food at the Ugandan market. The relief agencies invite for 
tenders and smaller export companies, the so-called "briefcase" 
companies2, bid for the tenders, supplying the tenders by purchasing the 
maize from smaller traders, for example the Iganga maize traders. Yet, 
since the "briefcase" companies only have a limited period of time to 
fulfil their tenders, they prefer traders who can supply larger amounts of 
maize thereby excluding the major part of the small-scale traders in 
Iganga. However, at the Kenyan market (which has a structural deficit of 
maize) the small-scale traders from Iganga have found a niche where 
they are more competitive than the Kampala-based "briefcase" compa-
nies. Thus, the Iganga traders' transport costs to the Kenyan border are 
lower, and small-scale traders often have lower production costs as 
storage and cleaning of the maize often are done in a casual manner (and 
the quality requirements are less demanding than at the relief market). 
The trade takes place as both formal trade and informal trade, mainly 
2. Jl.e export companies have been niclinamed the briefcase companies because theij generally 
have made fitlfe if any investment in the food Sector and therefore easifij can iw ltd, to another Sector 
if i L proves to L more profitable. ^Jt the lime of iL fiefJworh (1994-95) more than 40 
briefcase companies were Lidding for lenders of the re fief agencies. 
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from the border points Busia and Malaba, but also from less developed 
border points such as for example Sironko and Lwakhakha. The formal 
trade includes the sale of maize to the Kenyan parastatal, the National 
Cereals and Produce Board, N C P B (through Kenyan middlemen), 
whereas the informal border trade embraces smuggling across the border 
at places with no or less developed border points. The domestic market 
includes the sale of maize to both private urban consumers and 
governmental institutions, and is marketed through wholesale and retail 
shops in Iganga and nearby towns as well as big retail markets in 
Kampala. 
Methodology 
The study is based 011 seven and a half months of fieldwork during the 
period 1994-95. The major pait of the fieldwork (six months) was spent 
studying the economic performance of the group of small-scale traders 
in Iganga town. The main methodology used in this part of the fieldwork 
was semi-structured interviews, "collection" of life stories, and 
participant observation. The total number of traders interviewed in 
Iganga was 46; moreover 5 traders cooperatives/associations were 
interviewed. In many cases the traders were interviewed several times; 
and their trading activities in relation to the changes at the market were 
followed closely. Moreover, interviews were conducted with relevant 
officials in local ministerial departments, the Revenue Authorities, the 
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Town Council, etc. From Iganga town shorter trips were made in order 
to follow the market chain from production to consumption level. Hence, 
in company with the traders trips were made to villages in the different 
counties o f t h e district as well as to the Kenyan border. In these towns 
interviews bearing on the operation of the Kenyan market were con-
ducted with the Ugandan and Kenyan traders as well as with government 
and revenue officials. 
The remaining period (one and a half month) was spent in 
Kampala collecting literature and conducting interviews with relevant 
persons in marketing parastatals, ministries, relief organizations, 
briefcase companies, the Cooperative Movement, bodies conducting 
research 011 marketing of maize, and at the central domestic markets. The 
general aim of this part of the Fieldwork was to collect data on the 
national construction of a market, including the liberalization process, 
the privatization of the marketing parastatals, and the deregulation 
process. Moreover, data on the three markets, i.e. the Kenyan market, 
the relief market and the domestic market, were acquired. 
Identifying and classifying the traders 
Within Iganga town, the first step was to identify the maize traders. 
However, this proved to be relatively difficult since a large part of the 
inhabitants in Iganga had earlier been or were currently involved in food 
trading and or processing activities. Moreover, various forms of trading 
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activities existed, and not all of them were visible. It was thus necessary 
to seek to structure the heterogeneity of the economic universe of Iganga 
by classifying the traders according to the form of their economic 
activity. Five categories of traders were found: Storekeepers, millowners, 
mobile traders, "Kadongo Kamu", and "deal chasers". In short, the five 
categories of traders can be described in the following way. 
The storekeepers run/own stores from which they purchase 
maize (and other crops such as beans, millet, and coffee) from village 
stores/rural traders, and sell the crops to larger traders/companies who 
resell to the three markets, the relief, the Kenyan and the domestic 
markets. The stores are run either by individual persons or by coopera-
tive organisations/various forms of private associations. 
The millowners are individuals who own mills which either 
function as service mills (grinding flour against payment) and/or 
commercial mills (purchasing maize from farmers/small scale traders, 
grinding the flour and selling it to large-scale traders/companies who re-
sell the flour at the domestic market or to the relief market). 
The mobile traders are defined as traders operating without a 
permanent base operation, being mobile in the sense that they link up 
between Iganga town and the rural areas as well as the bigger towns. 
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"Kadongo Kamu" is the Lusoga3 name for petty traders hanging 
about the mills. In Lusoga, "Kadongo Kamu" means "one bag" referring 
to the rather modest volume of the business of this category of traders. 
The "Kadongo Kamu" purchase a few bags of maize corn from farmers 
or rural traders or from wholesale shops in Iganga town, finance the 
grinding of it and sell the maize flour to larger traders coming to the 
mills or to retail/wholesale shops in the town. 
"Deal chasers" (a term used by the other traders) act as 
middlemen between farmers who appear in the town in order to sell their 
maize. The "deal chasers" typically tell the farmers that (hey can get a 
certain price for the maize, they then sell the maize to a higher price, and 
rake in the difference. 
However, despite the fact that most tr aders would be classified 
according to these five categories of economic activities, it was evident 
that the categories were far from being static. Indeed, the categories were 
dynamic due to the mobility between the various forms of trading 
activities; in some cases the traders could be placed in several categories, 
but in most cases the traders would over a lifetime change between 
several of the categories. More generally, the categories of traders could 
be divided into two mela-categories: the stationary or sited categories 
3. oLuJoga id the language oj the main ethnic group, ijaioga, inhabitaling I he area, BuSoga. 
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(storekeepers, millovvners) and the mobile or site-less traders (mobile 
traders, "Kadongo Kamu", and "deal chasers"). The meta-categories 
refer to the nature of the activities (i.e. whether the activity is sited or 
not), but it also indicates whether the activity is a relatively permanent 
activity or an activity which people jump to and from. Over a lifetime, 
there was a tendency for the traders (at least for the more successful 
ones) to move from the mobile to the stationary categories as the latter 
were both more prestigious and less strenuous. There was, however, no 
sign of the traders in the first meta-category being more economically 
successful than those in the second meta-category. Thus each of the five 
categories included an economic differentiation; some were doing 
relatively well, while others were operating on a day-to-day survival 
level. 
Several factors appeared to be important elements in a so-called 
"trader's career" or rather to be important for the mobility between the 
different categories. Thus, the majority of the traders started off from 
what could be defined as "odd jobs" with frequent shift between 
different income-generating activities outside the organized labour 
market; some traders afterwards obtained what could be described as 
"client status" in relation to a patron, i.e. a prominent and prosperous 
trader operating on a larger scale. The clients would usually start by 
doing "donkey" work (i.e. hard manual work) for this trader, and 
gradually the client trader would benefit from the connections of the 
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patron trader. Despite the benefits of being related to a larger trader, this 
role also had certain limitations due to the dependency of the patron, and 
most traders would attempt to move away from this role. From here two 
factors appeared to be especially important in relation to becoming 
successful in trade, namely political comiections (especially in relation 
to the relief market) and capital. The issue of gaining access to capital 
was in many cases decisive as there was a general capital-shortage within 
the local society. Moreover, very few traders managed to obtain loans 
and credit from above, i.e. from banks and credit institutions, and the 
resources were generally meagre at village level, too. Hence, the traders 
were forced to look for resources within their own lines (i.e. through 
loans or grants from friends and relatives) or through other income-
generating activities. Thus, the traders had to establish and rely on their 
own self-supplying economic universe. 
The majority of the traders belonged to the main ethnic group 
of the area, namely Basoga, but the group also included traders belong-
ing to the ethnic groups Baganda, Banyankole, Bachicca, Bugishu, 
Itesot, and Indians. In all groups apart from the "Kadongo Kamu" the 
majority of the traders were men, and only few women were represented 
in the group of traders interviewed as well as in the total group of 
traders. Regarding the "Kadongo Kamu" the group consisted of an equal 
number of men and women, both in the group of traders interviewed, and 
in the total group of "Kadongo Kamu". One reason for the relatively 
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|,jgh number of women within this category was presumably that the 
"Kadongo Kamu" business only required a very small start-up capital 
and relatively easily could be combined with domestic duties as it did 
not require travelling. As to the women within the other categories of 
traders, there did not seem to be any special characteristics regarding 
their economic status; they were either doing fairly well (often due to 
connections through their husbands) or they were simply operating on a 
day-to-day level. 
An insecure economic universe 
The Iganga maize traders generally operate within a highly insecure 
economic universe with no safety net against misfortunes and accidents. 
In consequence, the traders become extremely vulnerable which is 
reflected in ups and downs in their careers. The risks the traders 
experience can be identified as being of both structural and personal 
character. The structural insecurity includes for example climatic and 
environmental instability causing unsteady agricultural production, 
altering market conditions, change of legislations governing the markets, 
political and economic turmoil, etc. Insecurity at a personal level 
encompasses for example theft and cheating, sickness, family problems 
and other forms of ill fortune which can befall and totally demobilize 
persons without safety nets. 
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Thus, for instance, Joseph Mwiri, a store owner, narrated how 
financial hardship due to family problems had economically knocked 
him off his feet. Mwiri explained how his brother a few years ago died 
from AIDS and left him with six children and a wife to take care of. At 
that time Mwiri already had twelve children of his own. Due to problems 
of feeding all the eighteen children (aging from 2 to 18 years) Mwiri 
only managed to purchase very little produce the year in question (1994); 
moreover, the prices were low due to the flooding of the market. All in 
all, the year 1994 was not one of the best, and it is doubtful whether 
Mwiri will be able to turn his luck in the future due to the remaining 
problem of still having to feed the many children. 
The story of a member of a cooperative society in Iganga 
likewise illuminates the traders' lack of safety nets against calamities. 
Haji, an elderly Musoga trader, explained how he back in 1985 had 
delivered coffee on credit to a coffee ginnery. Unfortunately, the coup 
e'tat by Tito Okello occurred, and the managers of the ginnery ran away 
without giving him any official papers to claim his money. Haji was out 
of business ... 
Various forms of malfeasance appeared to be one of the major 
forces causing insecurity and instability in the traders' lives. Three forms 
of malpractice were identified: the suppositions of "The dishonest 
trading partner", "Cheating the system" and lastly "Entrappement". 
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With regard to the first supposition, "The dishonest trading 
partner", one o f the most common events in the traders' lives was being 
cheated or swindled of money or produce by trading partners. I lence, 
virtually all the traders could narrate about how they once or several 
times had been cheated by their fellow partners. The most common way 
of being cheated was when a new trading partner, who had been trusted 
with money or produce, disappeared together with the produce/money. 
One "Kadongo Kamu" narrated: 
"There was a young man who was my trading partner 
in Bunya. Once I bought cassava and took the young 
man to deliver it at the mill (the "Kadongo Kamu" 
was at that time staying in the mill), he milled it and 
disappeared with the money (Ush. 200,000)\ I 
4.Jn 1994-95 one Jo ffar wai worth approximately 900 y3 an Jan Whiffing. 
(continue J.. J 
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reported him to the police, but since the young man 
had the money he bribed the police and they let him 
free". 
The second form of malfeasance, "Cheating the system" refers to 
Anthony Giddens' notion of trust in expert systems in his epos "Conse-
quences of modernity" (1990). According to Giddens the development 
of modern social institutions relies on two types of disembedding 
mechanisms: i.e. the creation of symbolic tokens (media of interchange 
which can be passed around regardless of the special characteristics of 
individuals and groups, for example money) and the establishment of 
expert system (systems of technical or professional expertise organizing 
large parts of the material and social environment). In relation to expert 
systems, one can trust it, but one can also be cheated by it, as for 
example by wrongly adjusted weighing scales. A female mobile trader 
told us about the different ways she had been cheated as a maize trader 
(in contrast to her former business of trading in molasses): 
"In maize trade I have been cheated so much. The 
main cheat is with weighing machines, they are 
adjusted to record wrong measurements. At times a 
sub-agent buys less maize than you sent for, promis-
ing to fulfil tender some other day, he then never 
delivers the maize. Sometimes they can even tell you 
to hire lony and when you go there is no maize. Some 
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directly disappear with money and never buy the 
maize". 
The third form of malfeasance, "Entrappement" alludes lo a more 
sophisticated (and less common) way of cheating by setting a trap for a 
trading partner. One female "Kadongo Kamu" narrated how she had 
been cheated many times by trading partners; yet, once she was cheated 
so forcibly that she gave up trusting anybody. She related how she once 
had a female trading partner: 
"... This woman encouraged me to trade maize in 
Busia ... She realised that I had made good profit and 
planned with soldiers to come and rob me of my 
money. That night she enticed me to sleep at her 
house and at night soldiers broke in and stole only my 
money (Ush. 800,000). The soldiers claimed to be 
revenue authorities who demanded trading documents 
from me, as I had none, they robbed me". 
The prevailing problem of malfeasance among the traders was intensified 
by the general moral state o f the complaint institutions. In Busoga there 
are various institutions (the police and the Resistance Councils (RC), 
i.e. the local government institutions) for channelizing complaints; yet, 
one could never be sure that the authorities would actually work for the 
benefit of the deceived. Hence, despite reporting to these bodies, in most 
cases (lie deceived would gain little, as for example in the case of the 
"Kadongo Kamu" above (who narrated how the police had been bribed). 
In general there were no formal sanctions against defaulters. The female 
mobile trader who had been robbed of Ush.800.000 explained how she 
had taken the case to court: "I took the case to the court . . . RC usually 
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adjourns the case, and responsibility to hunt down the defaulter is left to 
you. It is not easy to track down the money because of lack of time, 
transport expenses and fear to provoke deep hatred which might end up 
dangerous to the creditor". 
The anthropologist Paul Alexander has related the central 
position of trust within many trading relationships with exactly the lack 
of legal sanctions. He explains it in this way: "One reason why such 
relationships are often personalised is the lack of formal legal sanctions 
against non-completion of contracts; trust becomes a substitute for the 
law" (Alexander 1992:80-81). 
Another scholar, the anthropologist Jan Kees van Donge has a 
more controversial view on the question of the insecure economic 
universe of traders with reference to a study of Waluguru traders in Dal-
es Salaam (1995). According to Van Donge the insecure economic 
universe is primarily a social construction and it could be counteracted 
if the traders could stop cheating and get organized. Van Donge suggests 
various ways the traders would organize themselves and the market in 
order to decrease the insecurity: i.e. provide information on market 
supply and demand, establish a mutual insurance against bankruptcy, 
pool resources in order to provide credit facilities, etc. According to Van 
Donge, the main reason for the Waluguru traders' insecurity problem is 
the unstable social relations presumably caused by the traders' desire to 
be independent of lasting social bonds and their inability to nurture 
these. For this group of traders the only lasting social bond established 
is the marriage bond. To emphasize this point, Van Donge presents 
narratives of a few exceptionally successful traders whose businesses 
were characterized by the establishment of relatively strong and enduring 
trading partnerships. 
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Van Donge might be right in pointing to the general unstable 
and fragmented character o f t h e social relations among traders, and he 
might also be right that this is one of the major reasons for the prevailing 
lack of success among the traders. Yet, Donge seems to overstate the 
point by maintaining that this insecurity is solely constructed through the 
traders' lack of networking, i.e. not giving it a thought that insecurity 
might simply be the social reality of the traders. Hence, the lack of trust 
should not only be explained at the human agency level, but is 
presumably also embodied in the structuring living conditions of the 
traders. 
The importance of trust for the Iganga maize traders' 
strategizing and networking is presumably related to the serious absence 
of trust at both an institutional and an interpersonal level. Thus, as earlier 
mentioned, the traders frequently experienced defraud in both their 
business and in their private life, and the various complaint institutions 
did not offer much assistance to the deceived traders. According to 
various studies dealing with the subject trust, the loss of trust in 
interpersonal relations in everyday life is often caused by a generalized 
loss of trust in the monetary system, in the legitimacy o f t h e political 
system, and in the educational and religious institutions (Lewis and 
Weigert 1985, Giddens 1990). The process of loss of trust in crucial 
societal institutions often takes place in societies under severe strain and 
under the verge of fundamental changes like in Uganda during the civil 
war and the economic crisis in the 1970s and 1980s. Hence, this period 
of political disorder and economic decline had serious implications for 
the performance of modern institutions and resulted in a deep mistrust 
of the governmental provision of service. In general, in Uganda (and 
many other 3.world countries) the absence of trust in institutions and 
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interpersonal relations seems to be the rule rather than the exception. 
From this derives the general importance of personal connections within 
the society. Thus, for example, very few (wise) Ugandans would move 
into an Ugandan hospital without having made sure that they knew 
somebody at the hospital thereby assuring a better treatment. The 
Ugandan anthropologist Harriet Birungi (1994) has in a recent study of 
the use of injections in Busoga documented the present lack of trust in 
governmental health care and the local population's new ways of dealing 
with health care. According to Birungi, Uganda once had an excellent 
health system based on the monopoly of expert knowledge, but decades 
of political and economical disorder have resulted in the breakdown of 
the functioning of these modern institutions and consequently there is a 
widespread distrust of these institutions. However, trust is still important, 
but it happens to be trust embedded in social relations rather than in 
expert knowledge. Generally, since trust at a personal level is the crucial 
issue, many people pursue the provision of health service in 
non-governmental settings, i.e. private clinics which to a high degree are 
based on the personal attachment between health providers and users. 
Analogous to the study at hand, Birungi has found it valuable to make 
use of Giddens' conceptionalization of trust in her description of the lack 
of trust in expert systems: 
"... the faith that people had or would like to have in 
expert systems has diminished and people are 
questioning whether medical experts are doing their 
jobs for personal gain or other reasons. While 
symbolic tokens (medicines) circulate freely, the 
mechanisms supporting faceless commitment have 
been undermined and the demoralized health workers 
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make little effort at the face work that might instil 
confidence in their patients. It now appears that trust 
is sustained through localized social relations, and the 
reembedding in the contexts of interaction almost 
involves their restructuring." (ibid: 102-103) 
Trust: the cornerstone of trade 
For the Iganga maize traders, operating within a highly insecure 
economic universe with no formal sanctions against defaulters, trustwor-
thy trading partnerships become the crucial tool in their business. Let us 
look into how the traders established and contested these trustworthy 
trading alliances. One young trader, the director of the association 
Mukasa Import and Export Company, related how he found the other 
members of the association: 
"I met with the other people by chance as they 
brought their produce here. As we progressively 
cooperated I thought they were trustworthy and 
decided to do some research on the people in the 
villages they came from. I contacted people I knew in 
the specific villages and asked in informal ways about 
these persons. Sometimes people may say malicious 
things about other people, so I would ask around five 
people and if all say the same it must be true that the 
person is bad. I would for instance ask, 'I gave X 
some money to buy for me 1000 kilo of maize from 
your village. What do you think: will lie faithfully 
deliver it or do you think I made a mistake? You 
know I jus t met him at the store and 1 know so little 
about him'. After finding information about a person 
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from the store, I may also ask some old people to 
comment on his character. Choose old people because 
lliey are more likely to be well-informed about a 
person's background". 
The trader in question left no stone unturned in his attempt to find 
trustworthy trading partners. So far his work bore fruit as there had been 
no cheating or stealing within the company. A male mobile trader 
complied by and large to the above description of how to choose 
trustworthy partners. He explained the procedure: 
"Study his background from local people and as you 
continue dealing with him you know how far to go. 
Inquiries about someone must be done very wisely 
and in a subtle way. First find out secretly about the 
right person to ask for, make friends with locals and 
be as informal as possible in your inquiries". 
The construction of a locality membership thus becomes an index for the 
trustworthiness of lhe trader. The underlying purpose of this background 
checking is the question of a person's membership of a community and 
the implicit conclusion of an exercised social control of the person in 
question. In his publication "Trust and Power" (1979) the sociologist 
Niklas Luhmann has dealt with the importance of seeking information 
prior to trusting a person. According to Luhmann, the truster seeks in his 
subjective image o f l h e world some objective clues on whether or not 
trust can be justified. Yet, these clues do not eliminate the risk, only 
reduce it, and as stated by Luhmann: "They (the clues) simply serve as 
a springboard for the leap into uncertainty, although bounded and 
structured" (Luhmann 1979:33). Luhmann moreover relates the process 
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of formating and consolidating personal trust to the dimension of time 
by stating that forming trust relationships must be solved gradually, step 
by step (ibid:4l). 
This "principle of gradualness" was also found in relation to the 
formation of trust relationships among Iganga maize trading alliances. 
Hence, apart from acquiring information about a potential trading 
partner, another common procedure was for the traders to "test" their 
trading partners by making use of what an elderly store owner referred 
to as the "trust chain". He explained the procedure: 
"I am the first one to start the trust chain, for instance 
when someone buys coffee from me, say 5 tonnes, I 
suggest to the buyer to lend him some extra kilos, say 
200 kilos. If the buyer pays back next time, I may be 
able to leave him some money to buy coffee for. If I 
come and find that he lias bought the coffee, I start 
trusting him." 
The trader explained that this system only functions if the trader comes 
to buy frequently, and that he does not develop any relationship with 
chance customers. In these cases the agreement is strictly on cash terms. 
One young male "Kadongo Kamu" explained it in this way: 
"Trusting a friend is done progressively, you may for 
instance trust a friend with a little money to buy 
maize. If he's faithful with it, you keep on to widen 
your trust with him." 
Another Kadongo Kamu phrased it this way: "As the bible says, he who 
is faithful in a little is faithful in much". Or as expressed by a member of 
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a cooperative society: "Trust with trading partners is a matter of trial and 
error, but the longer you stay with a person the more you are able to trust 
him". Another way of testing a trading partner was also mentioned: 
"Sometimes you may know that a friend owes you a little balance and 
you may pretend not to know to see whether he returns it on his own". 
There appeared to be little variation between the various 
categories of traders and between men and (the few) women regarding 
the importance and ways of testing trust. However, there was a slight 
difference between the trust-testing measures adopted by for instance 
traders in cooperatives or mobile traders who were seeking long-term 
partnerships and the measures adopted by for instance "Kadongo Kamu" 
where the partnerships were of a less formal character and not necessar-
ily long-lasting. In the first case the traders would adopt extensive 
measures as for example checking a person's background, whereas in the 
case of for instance Kadongo Kaimi the measures adopted would be 
confined to making use of the so-called trust-chain. The prevailing 
difference between various groups of traders can be related to Giddens' 
thesis about the intertwinement of trust and risk. Hence, according to 
Giddens, the notion of risk will always be seriously calculated, although 
of course what is seen as an "acceptable risk" varies in different contexts 
(Giddens 1990:35). An expected long-lasting and extensive trading 
alliance will obviously require an extended testing procedure, as for 
example the background-checking procedure among the Iganga maize 
traders. Generally, the risk is calculated against (he effort used on 
contesting the potential trading partner. 
The time perspective was often mentioned in relation to the 
creation of reliable partnerships, the longer the relation, the less risk of 
being cheated. To the question of whether he was ever cheated, a 
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member of a cooperative society laconically answered: "It lias happened, 
but not with friends of 10 years or above". However, the timespan 
mentioned for developing reliable trading partnerships was generally 
shorter than ten years, i.e. between a few months to a few years, 
depending on the scale and art of the relationship. 
On a more general level, Niklas Luhmann has labelled the 
notion of trust "a supererogatory performance" which he defines in this 
way: "One may call supererogatory a performance which does not flow 
from some previously assumed duty but manifests itself as meritorious, 
and attracts respect" (ibid:43). Hence, trust causes norms to emerge. On 
the other hand, once established trust relations can still be breached 
resulting in their destruction. Luhmann phrases it in this way: "... it 
transforms conditions for emergence into conditions for persistence" 
(ibid:44). 
The importance of maintaining trustworthy trading alliances 
was also recognized by the Iganga maize traders. One "Kadongo Kamu" 
explained how he preserved a reliable trading partnership which had 
been established on the basis of the trust-chain: "After you trusted 
somebody, tested somebody after the method I just described, it's not 
easy to cheat me. If someone cheats me I will keep on demanding that 
the friend replaces the money with flour, that might not be so hard as 
replacing the money". Another trader, a male mobile trader who had 
been in the business for a few years, elaborated on how he had managed 
to keep free of cheating: 
"I'm so strict 011 buying and selling 011 cash terms. Of 
course selling on credit sometimes wins you friends 
but it is also good at causing conflicts. If any of my 
customers ask for credit I discourage them politely 
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claiming that someone else is paying me cash on the 
spot. Now they believe I have so many customers I 
can't sell them on credit. In fact they never realise 
how much I depend on them. They think they are the 
ones who need me more". 
However, by having managed to avoid being cheated this trader was an 
exception from the rule. The importance of trustworthy trading partners 
is obviously a result of the fact that trust cannot be taken for granted or 
as phrased by Luhmann: "trust (is) ... a gamble, a risky investment" 
(Luhmann 1979:24). 
Disenibedding and embedding - a three-step strategy 
We have now discussed the importance of trustworthy trading partner-
ships, showing their crucial role in the trading universe. The obvious 
question which follows is: what is the first criteria for choosing the 
people to be put through the "trial and error" process? Are they relatives, 
tribes mates, village mates, or just anybody who happens to be on the 
right spot at the right time? That is, what is the basis of establishing 
trading alliances? 
It appeared that the traders very consciously sought to avoid 
any biased premises on which to choose their partners. A trading partner 
could be anybody, which also the much used term "friend" denotes. A 
mobile trader declared: "Trust will be developed over a period of time 
and on one major ground: faithful handling of money. Tribe or blood 
relationship doesn't matter". This was how the traders spoke about their 
t rading network and it also appeared to be the way they practised their 
networking. The most pronounced avoidance of any criteria for selecting 
partners was that of relatives. Hence, a large number of the traders would 
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disapprove of cooperation with relatives, mostly with reference to 
jealousy and (lie fact that relatives often expect traders to share whatever 
litlle money they have accumulated. One mobile trader expressed it in 
this way: "Trading with relatives is bad because they know you so well 
that jealousy rates are high. There is also too much expectations from 
business - no reasonable room for saving". An elderly store owner 
expressed his opinion in this way: "It's better to trade with outsiders (i.e. 
non-relatives) because relatives tend to take the business for granted. For 
example if they mishandle money, there is no way you can discipline 
(hem. Secondly, relatives tend lo despise each other, so it's difficult to 
administer them". The store owner mentioned a problem which many 
traders referred lo: the problems of taking a relative lo the police or the 
Resistance Council. A "Kadongo Kamu" likewise had this very negative 
view of doing business with relatives: "It's not good to trade with 
relatives; they don't put respect in the business, (they) neglect (lie work, 
(they) don't respect the work. They have the vision of gelling a share 
from the work". 
However, some traders dealt with relatives in their business, for 
instance by sharing a store and had no problem in working with relatives. 
A trader, who had been working together with his cousins in a coopera-
tive store since 1981, explained it this way: "It seem unpopular for 
relatives to trade and many people are surprised (hat we can cooperate. 
But it would be profitable if relatives would trade together because lliey 
save a lot of money into (heir own families. II would be unprofitable for 
brothers to waste money renting different stores and paying separate 
tax". A female trader had chosen a strategy of disembedding her trading 
relationship with relatives. She explained how she had earlier cooperated 
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witli her brothers and sisters: "1 had 110 problem with them because I 
made sure that we traded separately, almost as strangers". 
Likewise, neither ethnicity or religion appeared to be of 
importance for the choice of trading partners. Most traders stated that the 
most important issue was whether somebody was trustworthy, and in 
relation to this tribe and religion had nothing to say. One trader phrased 
it this way: "Money favours no religion". In fact many traders would talk 
about Iganga maize traders in very rancid phrases, although few could 
indicate that they would choose not to cooperate with these if possible 
as the following "Kadongo Kamu" did: "Ha, Basoga are very untrue, I 
would rather trade with Baganda or with the Bagisu, lleso, etc. The 
Basoga can even go behind your back in business and they are very 
malicious". 
In general a large group of the traders appeared to have 
developed conscious strategies of abstaining from combining familiarity 
and business, or as expressed by one trader: "It seems belter to make 
friends (i.e. business friends/partners) with strangers because they are 
less mindful about your gains and less likely to develop jealousy". In 
relation to their business the traders seem not to be interested in being a 
part of these environments of trust as they too well know that this adds 
expectations ofsharing whatever little they have earned. Consequently, 
the traders, with their non-family networking strategies, try to adapt to 
the modern market economy where the only way fonvard is accumula-
tion of capital. However, in relation to making business with strangers, 
contestation of trust becomes necessary clue to the absence in time and 
space of the strangers the traders (consciously) are looking for. I lence, 
the trading partners' activities are not continually visible and the traders 
consequently have to implement strategies of checking people's 
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background as well as testing their behaviour in practice through the use 
of the trust-chain. On the other hand, with regard to the Busoga case, the 
"stranger" should not be so much of a stranger that he could not be 
traced. A male "Kadongo Kainu" explained it in this way: "It's good to 
trade with people when you know where they come from (i.e. from 
Busoga). If you trust a person from Buganda or Soroti, they might 
disappear and you don't know where to find them. You have to trust a 
person when you know where he comes from". In this way the Iganga 
maize traders try to prevent the worst consequences of the time-space 
distanciation and of doing business with "strangers". 
The Iganga maize traders' strategizing and networking seems to 
bear resemblance to Thomas Menkhoffs study of the Chinese traders in 
Singapore who consciously use a strategy of disembedding economic 
relations. Hence, Menkhoff explains how this group of traders have 
established long-term standing trading relations on the basis of trust in 
order to prevent risk; moreover, the traders avoid doing business with 
close relatives. After having abstained from cooperating with their 
biological relatives the Chinese traders create fictive categories of 
relatives for their "strategic" business friends (Menkhoff 1994). 
In a similar way the Iganga maize traders can be described as 
following a three-step strategy of networking. First ly, the traders seek to 
avoid establishing trading alliances with anybody who would confront 
them with moral obligations, mainly relatives. The dependence 
of kinship exist in both good and bad times; in a period of success the 
relatives are in their good right to demand a share o f t h e affluence; yet, 
in bad times the trader might have to depend solely on the relatives due 
to the general insecure economic life of these traders. The traders thus 
have to invent ways of dealing with their relatives which can diminish 
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their demands during good times without violating or destroying the 
security these give during bad times. This leads to the second step, 
looking for "strangers" within the local society since doing business with 
these can be done without harming the crucial kinship relations. Thirdly, 
having found these people, the traders start to familiarize this 
disembedded relationship by making use of the trust-chain. Thus, clue lo 
the lack of bolh institutional and personal trust within the Ugandan 
context a disembedded relationship is simply too risky. However, it is a 
crucial factor (hat the familiarization of the disembedded relationship is 
done within another economic sphere than the one of the peasant 
distributive society, namely within a sphere attempting to adopt the 
principles of a market economy. This means that the boundaries of the 
moral expectations of the personalizing of the depersonalized 
relationship are defined in advance in order not lo reach (he, for the 
market economy, so devastating expectations of a distributive solidarity. 
By avoiding trading with relatives, thereby avoiding the "inescapable" 
moral obligations and by constructing trust-proved "friendships" the 
Iganga maize traders have solved the problem of how to manoeuvre 
within two economic spheres. They are not violating the morality of the 
peasant sphere while at the same time they manage to cope with the 
demands of the market economy in the precarious Ugandan context. 
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